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Abstract 
The concept of multiple modernities has been developed with a view to highlighting 
the ways in which modern societies differ from each other. Other sociological 
approaches, by contrast, emphasize such societies' commonalities. But does the 
juxtaposition of convergence and divergence in the form of a mutually exclusive, 
binary opposition really make sense? Might it be that there is convergence in some 
respect, while diversity persists in other respects; that there are dimensions of social 
change that exhibit common trends across regions and cultural zones, while other 
aspects of social life show remarkable resilience against homogenization? 
The present paper argues that our observation of convergence or diversity might be 
less a matter of truth or falsity than an artifact of our chosen methodologies. Based 
on this premise, the concept of multiple modernities will be rejected as sociologically 
meaningless, conceptually flawed and empirically dubious. It is sociologically 
meaningless because its advocates fail to spell out sufficiently clearly what they 
mean by modern as against non-modern societies; it is conceptually flawed because 
it does not provide criteria for distinguishing theoretically significant from insignificant 
(or less significant) differences, and it is empirically dubious because it misrepresents 
the state of the world's development. 
Keywords 
Modernity, modernization, multiple modernities, comparative research, global 
modernity 
                                                 
* Portions of this paper were presented at the mid-term conference of the ISA Research Committee 
on Sociological Theory (RC 16) at Pusan National University, Pusan, South Korea, 23-25 June 
2008, and at the 38th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, Budapest, Hungary, 
26-30 June 2008. 
 2 
The concept of multiple modernities has been developed with a view to highlighting the ways 
in which modern societies differ from each other. Other sociological approaches, by contrast, 
emphasize such societies' commonalities. But does the juxtaposition of convergence and 
divergence in the form of a mutually exclusive, binary opposition really make sense? Might it 
be that there is convergence in some respect, while diversity persists in other respects; that 
there are dimensions of social change that exhibit common trends across regions and cultural 
zones, while other aspects of social life show remarkable resilience against homogenization? 
The present paper argues that our observation of convergence or diversity might be 
less a matter of truth or falsity than an artifact of our chosen methodologies. Thus, if we 
engage in cross-country or -regional comparison, then we are likely to detect (more or less 
profound) differences between the units of comparison (which need not be states), for to 
unravel such differences is precisely the purpose of our analysis – if we want to know what is 
unique to one case, then we have to find out how and why it differs from others. If, on the 
other hand, we are interested in long-term, fundamental transformations of entire societal 
formations (e.g., from pre-modern to modern societies), then we have to compare historically 
and hence will see many common developments at work in otherwise quite diverse regions. In 
short, the relative weight placed on convergence and/or divergence may be due primarily to 
the research questions pursued, in which case the respective findings would not necessarily 
contradict each other, but simply address different reference problems. 
Based on this premise, the concept of multiple modernities will be rejected as 
sociologically meaningless, conceptually flawed and empirically dubious. It is sociologically 
meaningless because its advocates fail to spell out sufficiently clearly what they mean by 
modern as against non-modern societies; it is conceptually flawed because it does not provide 
criteria for distinguishing theoretically significant from insignificant (or less significant) 
differences, and it is empirically dubious because it misrepresents the state of the world's 
development. 
 
II 
The main reason I consider the concept of multiple modernities to be sociologically 
meaningless is that it contributes little to our understanding of modernity – be it in the plural 
or in the singular. Modernity is an important concept in sociology, as it stands for the very 
societal formation to whose emergence the discipline itself owes its existence. Modern society 
is radically different from earlier modes of societal organization and the outcome of a 
fundamental transformation of society matched in historical significance only by the Neolithic 
Revolution. Theories of modernity, as we find them in the works of classical sociological 
thinkers such as Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel 
and Talcott Parsons, conceptualize modernization as an interlinked process of structural 
differentiation, cultural rationalization and personal individualization. 
Multiple modernists reject this conceptualization based on its alleged incapacity to 
capture the immense social, political and cultural diversity exhibited by the modern age. This 
diversity, they claim, can be accounted for only if we pluralize the concept of modernity. But 
before we can pluralize any concept, we first need to know what its variations have it 
common, because unless we do, we will not be able to tell whether a particular case is really a 
variation of the type in question or rather something else. There can thus be no meaningful 
talk of modernities without a proper definition of modernity. Regrettably though, such a 
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definition is conspicuously absent from the literature on multiple modernities, as even 
sympathetic observers have had occasion to note (see, e.g., Allardt 2005). 
We do, however, know what the notion of multiple modernities goes against, namely 
the above classical theories of modernity and, especially, the modernization theory of the 
1950s and 1960s, because Shmuel Eisenstadt, who coined the term, and several of his 
followers, have spared no effort to state their aversion to these theories (see Eisenstadt 2000a; 
Wittrock 2000). Taking modernization theory as a point of departure should therefore provide 
some hints as to the kinds of assumptions the critics must be making to lend the notion of 
multiple modernities theoretical credibility. 
The main point of contention between modernization theory and multiple modernists 
is the former's claim that modernization is a homogenizing process, ultimately leading to the 
convergence of the societies undergoing it: "a process of social change whereby less 
developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed societies", as Daniel 
Lerner (1968: 386) put it. 
But what does modernization theory actually mean by "convergence"? To answer this 
question, it is important to keep in mind that modernization theory is conceptually anchored 
in the work of Talcott Parsons. As is well known, Parsons' theory of modernity is embedded 
in a more encompassing theory of action systems. Society, in Parsons' conceptualization, is a 
subsystem of the social system, which in turn is one of four subsystems of the general action 
system, the other three subsystems being the cultural system, the personality system, and the 
behavioral organism. Modernization theory concerns itself only with the social, cultural and 
personality systems. It argues that upon modernization the personality system becomes 
increasingly achievement oriented, aware of its own individuality, and empathetic; that 
modernization leads to rationalization, value generalization and the diffusion of secular norms 
in the cultural sphere; and that functional differentiation is the dominant trend in, as well as 
foremost structural characteristic of, modern society, the social system that is of special 
interest to sociological theory (Lerner 1958, 1968; Parsons 1964, 1977). 
Much like other macro-sociological approaches, modernization theory places 
particular emphasis on (developments in) the economic and political subsystems of society, 
but other important subsystems such as the educational system, the scientific system, and the 
legal system are far from ignored. In the economy, the most salient change from the point of 
view of modernization theory is the emergence of self-sustained growth; in politics, it is 
growing participation by the citizenry; in education, the spread of mass schooling; in science, 
the establishment of the research university and other purely research-oriented institutions; in 
law, the increasing autonomy of professionally trained judges from external pressure and 
interference. 
This does not yet say very much about the institutional make-up of a modern society, 
as conceived by modernization theory. Once again, it helps turning to Parsons for guidance, 
this time to his theory of evolutionary universals. Therein, Parsons associates the progression 
of stages of societal evolution with critical breakthroughs in social organization that give 
more advanced societies an edge over less advanced ones in terms of their capacity to adapt to 
environmental conditions. In the case of modernity, Parsons identifies four such universals 
that he believes were crucial both for its breakthrough and ultimate consolidation: money and 
market systems in the economy, democracy in the political realm, the rule of law and equality 
before the law in the legal system, and bureaucratic organization of public and private 
institutions (see Parsons 1964). 
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This characterization, while still somewhat vague and fairly abstract, obviously bears 
much resemblance to "the" Western model, to which it does indeed owe a lot. Note, however, 
that it does not reflect a consensual position shared by all modernization theorists. Samuel 
Huntington, for instance, in his book Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), offers a 
less demanding conceptualization of at least political modernity by arguing that the most 
important political distinction in the modern age is not that between democracies and 
dictatorships but between governments that really govern the country under their (formal) 
jurisdiction and those that don't. A modern political order, on his conceptualization, is a 
system of rationalized authority wherein office holders are expected to serve the public 
(rather than purely their own) interest and have the capacity to execute chosen policies based 
on control of a well functioning state apparatus. This leaves room for political alternatives 
beyond (what is now widely viewed as) the Western model, for instance for authoritarian 
systems, as many of Huntington's critics have pointed out. 
Parsons too allowed for more than one path to modernity and for differential 
institutionalizations of its (socio-cultural) "program", as can be seen from his treatment of the 
Soviet Union as a near equal to the United States with respect to the depth and levels of 
modernization achieved by the second half of the 20th century (Parsons 1977: 216ff.). He was, 
however, skeptical as to the long-term stability of Soviet-style political systems because of 
their inbuilt legitimacy deficits (Parsons 1964: 126). History seems to have proven him right 
on this point. 
But be this as it may, Parsons, like other modernization theorists, explicitly stated his 
belief that there could be "[great] variations within the modern type of society" (Parsons 
1977: 228) and that many such variations would probably emerge as a result of the global 
trend "toward completion" of this type of society, a development which he predicted would 
likely continue well into the 21st century (ibid.: 241). 
The notion of convergence must be understood against the backdrop of this 
expectation. It applies first and foremost to the basic structure of society, the premise being 
that pre-modern and modern societies differ much more from each other than do the many 
varieties of (the one type of) modern society that emerge as a result of successful 
modernization, a process that Parsons viewed as far from complete. Convergence, thus 
understood, occurs when modernizing countries meet two main conditions. First, they must 
move toward establishing a set of key institutions that the theory regards as essential to 
modernity: a growth-producing, preferably capitalist economy; a system of "good", preferably 
democratic political governance; the rule of law and a legal system guaranteeing a core set of 
human rights; bureaucratic administrations staffed with technically competent personnel and 
insulated from "special" interests; a collectively run or regulated welfare system covering the 
entire population and securing its basic needs; mass (public) education; research and 
development in large science organizations, etc. Second, the countries in question must 
succeed in making these institutions perform in line with their stated purposes, rather than 
being mere "facades" (Meyer et al. 1997) of modernity. 
Even today, many countries fail to meet these conditions and hence would (presently) 
not qualify as being (fully) modern. Yet, while difficult to meet, neither condition requires 
any modernizing country to become exactly like the forerunners or even a complete replica of 
the United States, as some of modernization theory's fiercest critics have said it does. True, 
Parsons did suggest the United States could serve as "a model for other countries in structural 
innovations central to modern societal development" (Parsons 1977: 215), and other 
modernization theorists have done likewise. In the wake of the Vietnam War and the student 
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revolts of the late 1960s (arguably also of the decolonization of much of the non-Western 
world after the Second World War), this suggestion came under fire because it was widely 
interpreted as a barely camouflaged rationalization of American imperialism. Is it? I don't 
think so. Models are just examples to learn from in the quest to catch up with leaders that are 
currently ahead. To propose the United States as one such model made perfect sense because 
at the time the proposal was made the U.S. clearly was a leader, arguably "the" world leader 
in modern development: in the economy, in politics, in science and technology, in (higher) 
education, in popular (everyday mass) culture, and possibly in other fields as well. Today, the 
picture is more varied because, emulating "best practices" of institutional design and policy 
designation in the United States and other socio-economically advanced countries, the most 
successful of the followers – especially Japan and the four East Asian tigers South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore – have become models themselves. And what makes them 
attractive as models is precisely that they have already achieved what others are still striving 
for: becoming modern and catching up with the West. But one cannot become modern and 
catch up with the West without establishing a basic structure of society that is similar to that 
of the West, because this structure is the very condition of the West's success. Modernization 
theory understood that, and so have the most successful agents of real world modernization in 
late developing countries. 
 
III 
Let us now return to the multiple modernities paradigm. Recall that the gist of the paradigm is 
explicitly directed against modernization theory; against the view, to quote Eisenstadt (2000a: 
1), "of the convergence of industrial societies prevalent in the 1950s". This view, says 
Eisenstadt, must be rejected because "the actual developments in modernizing societies have 
refuted the homogenizing (…) assumptions of [the] Western program of modernity" by giving 
rise to mupltiple patterns of societal organization that are distinctly modern, yet clearly 
different from Western, or for that matter European, modernity. The contention, in short, is 
that modernization theory has been empirically falsified. 
Eisenstadt knows that the language of multiple modernities can be defended only if the 
differences claimed to exist between modern societies are really profound. Elsewhere (2000b: 
110f.), he has singled out Japan as the most important test case for modernization theory's 
convergence claim, given that the country was the first non-Western society to become fully 
modern. Since Parsons (1977: 228) shared this view, he would probably have agreed with the 
special weight Eisenstadt assigns Japan for any test of modernization theory's validity. 
Eisenstadt, in turn, while acknowledging that the reasons behind Japan's modernization drive 
may have been similar to those of its West European forerunners, maintains that the pattern of 
modernity that emerged from the process is not: modern Japan, he argues, exhibits 
peculiarities that are not just local variations of the Western model, but distinguish it 
fundamentally from this model (Eisenstadt 2000b: 111). 
He then goes on to substantiate his claim at some length through empirical illustration. 
The first example evoked concerns the goals and effects of social movements in 
contemporary Japan. Generally, such movements have tended to be less radical and 
confrontational than their Western counterparts according to Eisenstadt, and while successful 
in stimulating some reform, they fell short of inducing major change in the political center. 
This center is also not the main steering body of society, with collectively binding decisions 
often taken by diverse networks of bureaucrats, politicians and members of powerful interest 
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groups, rather than the government or parliament. Other features said to be unique to Japan's 
political system are the low weight accorded fixed principles or ideologies, which are mostly 
overridden by pragmatic considerations, and the relative weakness of the state vis-à-vis 
society that constrains the scope for coercive measures and promotes a consensual style of 
governance (Eisenstadt 2000b, ch. 3). 
Eisenstadt gives further examples of Japanese peculiarities, but none of a substantially 
different nature. Are they significant enough to support the claim that Japan constitutes a 
unique modernity, one that differs fundamentally from Western modernity? That depends on 
the conception of modernity employed. What little Eisenstadt and his followers have said 
about modernity indicates that theirs is a conception that focuses primarily on the political 
system and on questions of collective identity; more specifically, on the cultural or 
civilizational foundations of the "imagined communities" (Benedict Anderson) that inform the 
construction of the symbolic order of modern nation states, as well as some of the policies 
they pursue, regimes they establish, etc. 
The political system is certainly an important subsystem of society. Yet, it is only one 
of several such systems, and to reduce the whole of society to it arguably entails an overly 
simplistic conception of modernity, at least when compared with that underlying the 
differentiation theoretical tradition in sociology, which aims to capture modern society in its 
entirety. But regardless of what one makes of this, one thing should be clear from the above 
reconstruction of key modernization theoretical propositions: the evidence that Eisenstadt has 
mobilized against them so far poses no challenge to that theory whatsoever. For if we judge 
this evidence in the light of the theory's premises – as we must if our aim is to disprove it – 
then the kinds of difference he invokes are indeed nothing other than minor variations of a 
structure of society that Japan, like other East Asian modernizers, shares with the West. The 
same is true of what other multiple modernists have said to stress the importance of 
"difference" – none of their observations point systematically beyond the concept (or model) 
of modernity guiding modernization theoretical scholarship. Nobody denies that countries (as 
well as provinces, cities, towns, villages, etc.) differ from each other, have their own history, 
etc., but that was known long before the rise of the multiple modernities paradigm. If this 
truism is all it has to contribute to current debates in social theory, then that contribution is 
rather meager. 
To question the significance of some (kinds of) difference(s) for a theory of modernity 
is not to suggest we should be indifferent to differences per se. Modernization theory is 
certainly not. But to the extent that it does concern itself with differences, they tend to be ones 
that set modern society apart from pre-modern types of societal organization, that reflect 
greater or lesser degrees of modernization and development, that pertain to factors which are 
conducive or detrimental to modernization, etc. Differences of this sort, on the other hand, are 
largely ignored by the multiple modernities school. The reason is probably that multiple 
modernists, while otherwise highly attentive to differences, deny, or at least are unwilling to 
consider the possibility, that such differences might persist in the modern age. For from the 
perspective of this school, the whole world is equally modern now (Eisenstadt 2000a: 14). All 
contemporary societies are modern, only differently modern. 
A differentiation theoretical perspective raises doubts as to the soundness of this view. 
Take the case of India. India has been a political democracy since its independence in 1947, 
and thus, politically speaking, doubtless modern, despite many shortcomings of its 
democracy. At the same time, the caste system, and hence a social structure that is 
incompatible with (full) modernity, persists in India despite its legal abolishment many years 
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ago. This system divides the population into closed hereditary groups ranked by ritual status. 
Intermarriage and interdining across caste boundaries are prohibited, and the relationships 
between the various groups included in the system are strictly hierarchically organized, with 
the upper castes controlling positions of prestige and political as well as economic power, and 
the lower castes relegated to positions reflecting the lesser social worth or value ascribed 
them. The centuries-old link between caste and occupation, and, consequently, material 
wealth or poverty has become less rigid since the 19th century, but socio-economically 
privileged groups are still predominantly upper caste and vice versa. Much worse than the 
situation of members of the lower castes, however, is that of the so-called untouchables or 
Dalits and of numerous tribal peoples, who fall outside the caste system and hence have no 
place within the boundaries defined by that system whatsoever. According to a recent study, 
this group, comprising an estimated quarter of the Indian population, suffers extreme forms of 
exclusion, humiliation, exploitation, and deprivation. Especially in rural India, where 70 per 
cent of Indians live, many Dalits are denied basic rights of citizenship, such as protection 
against acts of violence or the confiscation of property, voting, access to public services, 
selling or buying of goods at public markets, entering temples, freedom in the choice of 
places of residence, sometimes even marriage. They often suffer from the imposition of 
forced, unpaid or underpaid labor (remunerated below market rates), sexual abuse, as well as 
visible acts of subordination and public insult, such as wearing filthy clothes, standing with 
bowed head, having to walk naked in public, etc. (Shah et al. 2006; Sooryamoorthy 2008). 
While the caste system is unique to India/South Asia, social cleavages and exclusions 
of the sort it produces are not; much of Latin America, for instance, exhibits similarly 
entrenched divisions between quasi-hereditary status groups (de Ferranti et al. 2004). Extreme 
forms of social exclusion pervading the whole structure of society are also found in parts of 
South East Asia (e.g., in the Philippines) and elsewhere in the (less modernized) world. 
Social structures that sustain (and socio-cultural traditions that sanction) practices and 
hierarchies such as these are incompatible with modernity because they are based (or 
premised) on categorical inequalities that subvert the principle of functional differentiation 
by erecting virtually insurmountable barriers between the underprivileged and the privileged, 
thus blocking social mobility. They also subvert the proper functioning of many formally 
modern institutions, which they effectively turn into instruments for advancing elite interests 
– through the allocation of both public positions (that are often filled on the basis of status 
rather than qualification) and funds (whose distribution tends to be highly regressive). 
Before the breakthrough to modernity, a social order dividing the population into 
strictly separated and hierarchized strata was the norm in all advanced civilizations; thereafter 
this order began to crumble and gradually had to give way to a new social order wherein each 
member of society is (to be) regarded (and increasingly also treated) as an equal. To 
hierarchical systems of stratification, the very notion of equality of status, and hence also that 
of equal citizenship, is alien and meaningless. Modern social systems, on the other hand, are 
certainly not egalitarian in all respects, but the inequalities they treat as permissible follow a 
different logic, are gradual rather than categorical in nature. Needless to say, this is an ideal-
typical distinction, because in the real world the two types of inequality tend to overlap 
everywhere. Analytically, the distinction is nevertheless important because it points to a key 
difference between the ideational foundations of modern and pre-modern societies. What to 
pre-modern societies is just an immutable fact of life, constitutes a permanent embarrassment 
to modern societies because it contradicts their self-understanding – the semantics in which 
they describe themselves and judge their performance. It is precisely for this reason that the 
existence of deep-rooted differences of social class, between the sexes, races, ethnicities, etc., 
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in short: the existence of ascribed (essentialized) differences, is a problem that requires 
ongoing remedial effort and/or justification in modern society. 
Cultural traditions often serve to perpetuate hierarchies and practices of pre-modern 
origin. A field in which this is particularly evident is gender relations. The comparatively low 
value placed on the lives of girls and women in parts of South and East Asia is responsible for 
widespread female feticide and infanticide, resulting in a highly "skewed" sex ratio and tens 
of millions of "missing" women in India and China (Croll 2000). Unicef (2006) estimates that 
more than 130 million women and girls that are alive today have been subjected to forced 
genital circumcision in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa as well as in 
parts of Southeast Asia – and many more could be alive had the victims not died from the 
often grave health consequences of the procedure. Illiteracy rates for women in India, but also 
in many Arab countries, are two times as high as those for men, and many more girls and 
women than boys and men are undernourished because of cultural norms affording eating 
priority to males (Sudarshan and Bhattacharya 2006). Forced marriages and "defense of 
honour" killings of non-compliant daughters or sisters are the order of the day in much of the 
Muslim world, especially in its least developed parts and among the least educated segments 
of the population. The list goes on and on. Violence against (und subjugation of) females is of 
course not unique to pre-modern social settings, but while they form part of the taken-for-
granted cultural heritage of much of the pre-modern world, the modern world has eroded their 
legitimacy and is increasingly taking steps toward abandoning and penalizing them. 
For a school of thought as sensitive to "difference" as the multiple modernities school, 
it is remarkable how little attention it pays to differences such as these, which are almost 
totally absent from its accounts of (diversity in) the modern age. Might the reason be that they 
are hard to reconcile with a perspective that treats all countries and world regions as equally 
modern? That, at any rate, is how things appear from a differentiation theoretical perspective, 
according to which the most important difference between modernity and its evolutionary 
precursor is that between stratificatory and functional differentiation of society (Luhmann 
1997). As long as stratification continues to be the dominant mode of societal structuring, 
modernity, in this view, cannot be said to have genuinely established itself. 
Assuming there are differences that, rather than reflecting intra-modern diversity, are 
better understood as demarcating zones of greater or lesser levels of modernization attained, 
then one needs criteria by which to judge particular cases. Differentiation theory proposes one 
such criterion, the degree to which functional differentiation has been realized, and 
modernization theory adds others, e.g., the levels of socio-economic and socio-cultural 
development, the spread and performance of modern institutions, and others. And while any 
proposal is debatable, these two schools at least venture to make ones. The multiple 
modernities school, by contrast, appears unwilling to concern itself with truly fundamental 
differences, while making much of relatively minor differences in the expressive cultures of 
contemporary nation states; of, as John Meyer (2000: 245) put in bluntly, "things that in the 
modern system do not matter". That's the reason I consider the approach to be conceptually 
flawed. 
As indicated above, modernization theory can easily accommodate differences of the 
sort that matter to the multiple modernists, because its concept of modernity is sufficiently 
abstract to permit a great deal of variation within the modern type of society. Modernization 
theory does not emphasize such variation very much, but since it does not affect modern 
society's fundamental building blocks, that which distinguishes modernity from other societal 
formations, it rightly ignore it, because (unless and until proven otherwise) it has no bearing 
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on its subject matter. Only differences that make a difference for this reference problem ought 
to be taken into account by a theory of modernity. Sociology is not bereft of conceptual tools 
permitting us to consider other (e.g., cross-country) differences within a suitable research 
framework, but confusing the study of modernity with the comparative analysis of 
developmental policy paths pursued, of institutional regime types enacted, of collective 
identities (temporarily) adopted, and of allegedly unchanging cultural traditions upheld, by 
(the elites of) particular modern countries simply conflates levels of analysis and hence does 
not further our understanding of either. To conceptualize varieties of the latter sort, one 
should better resort to various "middle range" theories, as famously proposed (but unduly 
privileged over "grand theory") by Robert Merton. 
 
IV 
I will now look at several post-World War II developments that I believe lend support to 
some of modernization theory's main propositions regarding the consequences of 
development (see Huntington 1971 for a summary). The starting point is the historian Eric 
Hobsbawm's (1994: 288; emphasis in original) observation that the period from the 1950s 
onwards saw "the greatest and most dramatic, rapid and universal transformation in human 
history (…). For 80 per cent of humanity the Middle Ages suddenly ended in the 1950s; or 
perhaps better still, they were felt to end in the 1960s". 
That is a bold claim, not only in terms of its substantive content, but also in terms of 
its conceptual meaning. For what Hobsbawm says can be read as suggesting that modernity, 
far from being superseded by an entirely different type of society (as the literature on "late" or 
"post" modernity implies), is only just beginning. Do we have evidence supporting such a 
sweeping claim? 
I think we do. Hobsbawm himself reports several major changes, "the most dramatic 
and far-reaching" of which he considers to be "the death of the peasantry" (ibid.: 289). This is 
indeed a dramatic change because it means nothing less than the global end of the Neolithic 
era during which the overwhelming majority of humankind had been securing its livelihood 
through (mostly subsistence) agricultural economic pursuits. And before agrarian society 
disappears, modernity cannot really unfold. It all began with the Industrial Revolution, whose 
impact initially remained small even in Britain though, where it affected only a relatively 
confined sector of the economy until far into the 19th century. As late as the 1930s and 1940s, 
the agricultural population still comprised up to 40 per cent in (what then were) the world's 
socio-economically most advanced countries, down from 60 to 90 per cent in the centuries 
preceding the Industrial Revolution (Crone 1989). By the 1980s, it had been reduced to levels 
as low as three to five per cent. Thus, in a matter of roughly two hundred years, what had 
determined the living conditions of humanity's overwhelming majority for millennia, had 
virtually vanished from this part of the planet. It took until 1990 before the peasantry became 
a global minority (Firebaugh 2003). Today, it is estimated to comprise roughly 43 per cent of 
the world's workforce (ILO 2006). 
A change that typically accompanies the decline of the peasantry is the rise of the city. 
Modern life, it is widely agreed, is urban life. But until recently, most of the world's 
population lived in rural areas. That is changing now. Since 2007, half the world's population 
has been urban for the first time. The trend is expected to continue with the rapid socio-
economic transformation of newly industrializing countries, especially of China, where by 
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2020 roughly 60 per cent of the population is expected to live in cities. Two hundred years 
earlier, just 2.5 percent of the world's population lived in cities with more than 20,000 
inhabitants (Kumar 1999). By 1900, that figure had risen to 13 per cent (Economist, 3 May 
2007) – a fivefold increase in just eighty years, but in terms of its effects on humanity at large 
still a far cry from the latest leap. And whatever else may be said about this change, life in the 
city undoubtedly differs radically from that in the countryside. 
A further important change concerns levels of education and literacy. Between the late 
18th and 19th centuries, several northwest European countries and North America began to 
institute compulsory education in state-run or state-controlled schools. By 1870, 30 countries 
reported enrolment figures of over 10 per cent for the 5-14 year age group (Meyer et al. 
1992). Looking at some of the effects, Britain had reduced the illiteracy level of its population 
to three per cent as early as 1900 (Landes 1998); other leading countries, while mostly 
lagging behind, were quickly catching up. Elsewhere, however, mass education took off only 
after 1945, but as soon as 1985, it was compulsory in 80 per cent of the world's countries. As 
a result, between 1970 and 1990, global literacy levels rose from 48 to 75 per cent; today that 
figure is 82 per cent (UNDP 2006). In other words, it was only during the past quarter century 
that educational modernity broke through globally. 
One of the effects of industrialization has been historically unprecedented levels of 
wealth. Income per capita for the world as a whole increased eightfold between 1820 and 
1990. However, half of this increase occurred during the last 40 of these altogether 170 years 
(Firebaugh 2003). Initially, the growing wealth was very unevenly spread. "Popular 
affluence" did not become general even in much of Western Europe until the 1960s, with 
North America just a few decades ahead. Given that the era of "modern economic growth" 
(Kuznets 1973), whose onset Angus Maddison (1995) dates back to roughly 1820, reached 
the rest of the world other than Japan only after 1950, this wealth was initially also highly 
concentrated in the West. Thereafter, it began to spread to other parts of the globe. In the so-
called golden age from 1950 to 1973, per capita incomes rose significantly in all world 
regions, thereafter they continued to rise only in the West and in Asia, primarily East Asia. 
However, since 1973 Asia grew more than double the rate of the West. One result is a 
massive poverty reduction both in the region itself and (due to its population share) globally; 
a trend that has continued since 1990 and is expected to do so in the decades ahead 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2006). 
Using the one dollar per day consumption standard of the World Bank, poverty was 
the "norm" for humankind for millennia. Globally speaking, three quarters of our ancestors 
fell below that poverty line two centuries ago, and with an estimated per capita income of $ 
651 annually, the average world "citizen" was in fact close to it in 1820 (Firebaugh 2003: 13). 
130 years later, the share of the (thus defined) poor had been reduced to one half of the 
world's people, today it is down to one sixth (UNDP 2006) – even though rapid population 
growth means the absolute number of poor people is now probably higher than ever before. 
Mirroring the reduction of poverty since 1820, a middle income group slowly emerged. 
Presently, with annual incomes of over $ 7,000 of purchasing power parity, roughly one 
fourth of the world's population has reached levels of prosperity that qualify it for 
membership in the so-called "consumer class" (Worldwatch Institute 2004); a class that 
comprised a negligible minority just half a century earlier. In the view of economists, this 
development reflects "the greatest advance in the condition of the world's population ever 
achieved in such a brief span of time" (Easterlin 2000: 7). 
 11 
Industrialization, urbanization, mass education and rising incomes virtually 
everywhere result in higher life expectancy and declining fertility. As for the latter trend, 
fertility levels have been falling globally during the past four to five decades, but most 
dramatically in socio-economically advanced regions, where they are now universally below 
the replacement level. For women, in particular, this development "represents nothing less 
than a revolutionary enlargement of freedom" (Titmuss 1966: 91), as it frees them from the 
wheel of childbearing and childrearing that had dominated their lives for thousands of years. 
The reduction in Asian fertility levels alone, which accounts for four fifths of the global 
fertility decline, has been labeled a "revolutionary" change (Caldwell 1993), "one of the most 
significant events of modern times" (McNicoll 1991: 1). 
A "revolution in the status of women" (Nazir 2005) has also occurred in other respects 
during the past couple of decades, namely through their formal recognition as persons and 
citizens, their constantly rising levels of education, labor market participation, etc. This 
development set in roughly a century ago in Europe and North America, but even there it 
gained momentum only after World War II, arguably even as late as the 1960s, following the 
rise of a powerful feminist movement. Since then, it has become a global trend (Berkovitch 
1999), leaving no world region unaffected, although, as indicated in section III, the degrees of 
penetration obviously differ enormously (for an overview of the present situation, see Unicef 
2006). 
The list of changes does not end here; it could be extended by several important 
developments in the fields of technology (e.g., the rapid expansion of high-speed mass 
transportation systems and of mass communication systems that have extended the 
geographic mobility and world awareness of billions of people enormously within a few 
decades), in the global economy (i.e., the reversal of a situation in which only a minority of 
the world's population lived under capitalist institutions to the present situation, where this is 
true of the large majority, in just two decades), in the political sphere (since 1992, for the first 
time more than half of all states have been governed democratically), in the areas of science 
and medicine, etc. 
Considered by themselves, each of these developments marks a dramatic change in the 
domain(s) of life and sphere(s) of society they affect. Taken together, they mean little less 
than a social revolution, resulting in a fundamental transformation of the entire society, 
which, once it has undergone this transformation, bears little resemblance to anything known, 
or at least experienced on a mass basis, before. They also suggest that modernity has finally 
broken through globally. For the first time since its early manifestations in Renaissance 
Europe, it has begun to touch and shape the lives of large parts, if not the majority, of the 
world's population. 
The millennium thus ushers in global modernity; a watershed in the history of 
humanity, because, unlike much other change, the change that this transition, the transition to 
genuinely modern living conditions and institutions, involves is "comparable in magnitude 
only to the transformation of nomadic peoples into settled agriculturalists some 10,000 years 
earlier", as Reinhard Bendix (1977: 362) aptly states. However, even at the beginning of the 
21st century, this transition, despite affecting all world regions, has not been equally far-
reaching everywhere, for, as I have tried to show in section III, in most parts of the world 
deep-rooted remnants of the old order uneasily co-exist with modern institutions and life 
forms, keeping modernity in check, as it were. 
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"Full modernity" has so far probably arrived only in two world regions, namely the 
(recently much expanded) West and East Asia (Tu 2000), the latter being represented by 
Japan and the four "tigers" South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as 
(growing) parts of their neighborhood. Given the world's uneven levels of socio-economic, 
cultural, institutional and social structural development, these two regions should therefore 
prove the best testing grounds for claims concerning the consequences of modernization, 
including those pertaining to the problem of "convergence" and/or "diversity" – a view not 
dissimilar to Eisenstadt's point about Japan's importance for this test, but extending its basis 
beyond Japan's borders. I close this section with some empirical observations comparing East 
Asian and Western modernity. 
One feature that East Asian and Western modernity share, and that arguably 
differentiates them more from other world regions than from each other, is the "systemic" 
quality of the modernization processes they underwent and continue to undergo, meaning that 
"changes in one factor are related to and affect changes in other factors" (Huntington 1971: 
288). Modernization in these two regions, rather than being confined to particular sectors of 
society and/or certain segments of the population, has been and continues to be an all-
inclusive phenomenon, transforming every aspect of societal organization and the lives of all 
members of society in a very short time span. A second, and related, aspect that the respective 
modernization processes share is the direction of change. With minor variations, comparable 
political, administrative, legal, economic, scientific, educational, welfare etc. systems are in 
place that pursue largely similar goals, run similar institutional programs, and are more or less 
equally effective. All countries in question are rich, some a little more than others. They all 
face similar problems and they all respond to them in roughly similar fashion. All observe 
each other in the quest for models/"best practices" to be emulated, or pitfalls to be avoided, at 
home. Major policy reforms pioneered and successfully implemented by one country (or other 
administrative unit) are sooner or later copied, with some local variation and adaptation, by 
the others, and the laggards of the past may well be the leaders of the present or the future. 
The populations share many characteristics: levels of education, employment structures, 
hopes and aspirations, life styles, living arrangements, fertility levels, consumption patterns, 
and, as global surveys show, increasingly even value systems (with "self-expression" values 
becoming more prevalent over time and "traditional" values slowly subsiding, though 
nowhere fully disappearing; see Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
Of course, differences are also to be found between and within the two regions. In 
terms of their impact on the performance of public institutions and private organizations, 
these differences are relatively insignificant though, and they pale, once again, in comparison 
to the differences that distinguish the group as a whole from the rest of the world that has not 
yet reached comparable levels of modernization/degrees of modernity. There are certainly 
differences in the political systems, and in terms of the political, legal and social conditions 
facing (different groups of) citizens, these differences can matter a great deal. At the same 
time, the respective polities all excel in "good governance", serving the people better than 
their (often highly corrupt, if not outright "predatory") equivalents elsewhere in the world. 
Different varieties of capitalism may be practiced in (parts of) North America, Europe and 
East Asia, and the respective business cultures also vary somewhat, but together, the 
economies of "full modernity" top any list of global competitiveness, productivity, efficiency, 
innovativeness, leaving other regions far behind. The welfare systems established by the 
group's "members" differ markedly, but in contrast to much of the rest of the world, where 
such systems barely exist, they all have functioning mechanisms for protecting the most 
vulnerable and for aiding the poor in place (Schmidt 2008). They also dominate the world's 
research and development, and while the West was much ahead until recently, East Asia has 
 13 
rapidly caught up and now is the only region outside the West that has a sizeable number of 
world-class universities/research institutes. Not surprisingly, the science produced there 
addresses the same global community, uses the same methodologies and follows the same 
standards of excellence. Taken together, the two regions also boast the best educational and 
medical systems in the world, and while the organization of both systems varies slightly from 
country to country, they share key premises, technologies and characteristics, not the least of 
which is a common knowledge base. And so on, and so forth. 
We also find some differences in the ordinary lives led by the various populations: in 
the rites they perform, in the deities (if any) they worship, in the (religious and secular) 
festivals they celebrate, in the diets they prefer, etc. Yet, the lived experience of a typical 
ethnic Chinese physician/business woman/office clerk/industrial worker in Singapore 
probably resembles that of her Anglo-Saxon (or French or Swedish, etc.) counterpart living 
anywhere in the world more than that of a typical Chinese peasant living in one of China's 
poorest western provinces or that of her own ancestors who migrated to Singapore three 
generations earlier. If the multiple modernists were right, then common cultural roots should 
separate the ethnic Chinese more from their Western counterparts than from each other; if 
modernization theory were correct, then we would expect greater homogeneity within socio-
economically similar groups than among people of similar ethnic and civilizational origin, but 
subject to vastly different levels of development. The available evidence, of which I have 
discussed only a small fraction in this section, clearly favors the second proposition. 
 
V 
The conclusion of the foregoing must therefore be that, empirically speaking, the reasons for 
retaining a singular concept of modernity seem weightier than those offered for discarding it. 
From a social theoretic viewpoint, the concept of multiple modernities never made sense 
anyway, because it rests on a too simplistic, as well as underspecified, theory of modernity, 
making much of relatively small differences in the political systems and expressive cultures 
of some of the world's nation states, while downplaying, if not altogether ignoring, social 
structural, institutional and other (including cultural) differences that cut far deeper and that 
arguably divide the world into a growing modern part and a "rest" that has not yet fully 
accomplished modernity. 
Where modernity has progressed furthest, it takes on a remarkably similar shape in 
practically all institutional sectors of society – in the political system, in the economy, in the 
legal system, in the educational system, in the scientific system, in the medical system, etc. – 
as well as in the living conditions and life styles of the people. Thus, if we avoid equating 
convergence with identity, then modernization theory got it right. 
Proponents of a singular concept of modernity need not deny (or belittle) cross-
country/regional variations. Nor does such a concept preclude the possibility that some 
variations may be quite profound – or at least appear so when comparing modern 
countries/regions synchronically, rather than studying the evolution of societal formations in a 
diachronic fashion, as befits a theory of society/modernity. In other words, the emphasis 
placed on differences/similarities is not simply a matter of facts, but should (also) vary with 
the reference problems pursued and with the research perspectives adopted. As trivial as this 
may seem to be, it is overlooked in much of the pertinent social science literature. 
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Assuming a careful study of the institutional and everyday realities in different 
modern countries yielded sufficient diversity to warrant conceptual attention, then a better 
alternative to the fuzzy notion of multiple modernities might be a yet-to-be-developed 
concept of "varieties of modernity" (Schmidt 2006) that, while permitting us to retain a 
unitary concept of modernity, would provide ample scope for capturing intra-modern 
differences. But even the proposal of such a concept would require a strong justification; just 
a few differences here and there would not be good enough. What one would have to find to 
justify it are coherent patterns of institutional co-variation that systematically separate not 
only the economies or polities or educational systems etc. of one group of countries from 
those of others, but the whole institutional make-up of society across the board and according 
to a common, overarching logic that visibly shapes all (important) subsystems. For instance, 
if it was claimed that a peculiarly "Confucian" or "East Asian" or "Korean" variety of 
modernity exists that differs substantially from, say, "Protestant" or "Catholic" or "West 
European" or "North American" or "Canadian" or "Danish" or whichever modernity, then 
what would be needed to support this claim is evidence showing that the respective signifier 
decisively marks the outlook of all societal subsystems in the variety in question, such that 
something very important would be missed if this was ignored in conceptualizations of 
modernity and instead discussed within the framework of other concepts, pitched at lower 
levels of abstraction. As long as we cannot demonstrate the existence of such cross-system 
homologies, we had better content ourselves with the tools we already have for analyzing 
area- and policy-specific variations (such as American-style vs. Japanese-style industrial 
relations; French vs. Taiwanese education policies; etc.) or sector-specific variations (e.g., 
types of capitalism, types of governance, types of welfare provision, etc.) prevailing in certain 
countries or regions. For when we talk about modernity, be it in the singular or in the plural, 
then we have to focus on society in its entirety, not just in this or that dimension. 
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